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weaknesses of the underlying economic policy model and outline an alternative concept 
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JEL classification: E61, E62, E 63, E 64 
 
Keywords: Broad economic policy guidelines, European Union, monetary policy, wage 





Graduate School "The Future of the European Social Model" 






                                                 
* This paper is a revised and updated version of an earlier German paper which has been published in Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft, 31(1), 2005, pp. 11–40.   1 
1. Introduction 
 
Despite some initial signs of economic recovery, it is currently still not possible to talk of a 
pronounced upturn within the European Union (EU). The EU-15’s growth rate for 2004 of 
2.3% remains below that of the USA, and the unemployment rate of over 8% has stayed at a 
high level considerably above the one in the USA. The figures for the countries in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) are even worse, with a growth rate of just under 1.9% and 
an unemployment rate of 9% (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 2004: 634, 639). Furthermore, it appears 
that the budgetary consolidation strategy of recent years has failed to pay off. Since 2002, the 
current budget deficits in Germany and France in particular have exceeded the 3% limit set by 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).  
 
For several years now, various economic policy measures have been employed at EU level in 
an attempt to stimulate sustained growth and employment. Since 1993, the key EU economic 
policy document in this regard has been the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. They provide 
an overarching model for European economic policy and the policies of the member 
countries. Structural reforms and a supposedly ‘stable’ macroeconomic framework are 
intended to enable the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy’s goal of making the EU the 
world’s most competitive and dynamic economy until 2010. 
 
However, these efforts have hitherto met with little success. Is this because the Guidelines 
have been incorrectly implemented, or is it the Guidelines themselves that are at fault? In 
order to answer this question, we begin by describing how the Guidelines came about in the 
first place and the goals which they were designed to pursue. We then provide an overview of 
the current procedure for drawing up the Guidelines, before analysing their underlying 
economic policy model. Having set the scene in this way, we move on to establish the extent 
to which the Guidelines have achieved their intended goals and consider the extent to which it 
is actually possible for them to achieve such goals. We show how, far from promoting 
dynamic growth, implementation of the recommendations contained within the Guidelines 
has resulted in a restrictive policy that in fact acts as an obstacle to achieving the goal of 
fostering growth and employment. We conclude by outlining an alternative policy approach 
and associated institutional reforms that could, in our view, lead to a sustained improvement 
in both short-term and long-term growth.  
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2. The background 
 
At the end of the 1980s, the difficulty encountered by some currencies in keeping within the 
exchange rate fluctuation limits set by the European Monetary System (EMS) led to plans for 
a new single European Union monetary policy that would be complemented by some 
elements of supranational economic policy co-ordination. The development of this Economic 
and Monetary Union was entrusted to a working group created at the 1988 Hanover Summit 
and was led by the then President of the Commission, Jacques Delors (Dyson/Featherstone 
1999: 326–342). The remainder of the group consisted of the central bank presidents of the 
EU member countries (such as Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pöhl and Wim Duisenberg 
from the Dutch Central Bank), and three external experts.
1 The Delors Report was submitted 
by the working group on 12 April 1989 and contained proposals regarding economic and 
monetary integration. These two elements, however, did not receive equal weight, since the 
proposals for monetary integration went much further than those for economic integration. 
While on the one hand the report called for the creation of an independent central bank 
committed to achieving price level stability (Delors Report 1989: 21-3), this was not matched 
by an integrated economic policy at supranational level – all that was proposed was a form of 
loosely binding co-ordination.
2, 
3 Co-ordination was to take place above all in the area of 
fiscal policy, in order to ensure that it could not have a negative influence on monetary policy. 
The report also proposed that, while budgetary policy would continue to be the responsibility 
of the member countries, national budgets should be monitored with a view to limiting the 
extent of budget deficits. In addition, the report called for a regular joint evaluation of 
economic development and guidelines for economic policy (Delors Report 1989: 16-21).  
 
The negotiation and development of the ensuing monetary union framework took place 
almost entirely without public debate. The EMS had already led to the establishment of a 
                                                 
 
1 The three experts were Alexandre Lamfalussy (Bank for International Settlements), Niels Thygesen 
(Copenhagen University) und Miguel Boyer (Banco Exterior de España). 
 
2 “A monetary union would require a single monetary policy and responsibility for the formulation of this 
policy would consequently have to be vested in one decision-making body. In the economic field a wide range of 
decisions would remain the preserve of national and regional authorities. However, given their potential impact 
on the overall domestic and external economic situation of the Community and their implications for the conduct 
of a common monetary policy, such decisions would have to be placed within an agreed macroeconomic 
framework and be subject to binding procedures and rules.” (Delors Report 1989: 14) 
 
3 The co-ordination concept proposed in the Delors Report had already been around for quite some time. The 
Treaty of Rome (1957, Article 6) already called on the member countries to coordinate their economic policies. 
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network amongst the central banks, and despite the official insistence on the parallel 
development of economic and monetary convergence, individual governments in practice left 
the negotiations mainly in the hands of their finance ministries. The result was that key policy 
decisions were taken by a small circle of monetary committee experts or the council of central 
bank presidents. This accounts for the extremely high level of consensus among the parties 
involved, all of whom shared the opinion that a single currency area would require an 
independent central bank in order to ensure price level stability, as well as an institutional 
means of limiting member countries’ budget deficits (Dyson 1999).  
 
There was, however, disagreement regarding the nature and the extent of the EU-level 
economic policy co-ordination or management that should accompany monetary union. In the 
following paragraphs, we will discuss four proposals for the EMU framework - by the 
Commission, the German and French governments, and the Dutch Presidency - that mark the 
key stages of the debate.
4  
 
The Commission’s proposal concentrates mainly on the monetary policy aspects of 
integration. The proposals concerning economic policy co-ordination are much more 
restricted in scope, although they are undoubtedly more comprehensive and specific than the 
proposals subsequently made by the individual governments. The Commission identifies three 
instruments or processes for the implementation of a common economic policy (Proposal by 
the European Commission 1993 [1990]: 199f.). Firstly, it calls for common and country-
specific guidelines pertaining to national budgets, wage policy and structural policy to be 
drawn up and reviewed, thereby providing a blueprint for the subsequent Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines. Secondly, it proposes a regular joint evaluation of economic development 
as a concrete means of pursuing the Treaty’s goal of harmonising the economic policies of the 
member countries. Thirdly, the Commission calls for the creation of a Community support 
programme offering budgetary support or special loans to countries experiencing financial 
difficulties.  
 
The subsequent French proposal, which was published on 25 January 1991, needs to be 
understood in the context of an approach to economics that has traditionally tended to place 
                                                 
 
4 The first proposal to be examined is the Commission’s, which already attempts to bring together the 
member countries’ views. In the ensuing debate, the member countries tended to support either the French or the 
German position. The Dutch Presidency’s proposal was a compromise solution that eventually found expression 
in the Maastricht Treaty.  
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greater emphasis on government control (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 221–230). In line with 
this gouvernement économique approach, the French proposed that the Council of Ministers 
should co-ordinate member countries’ economic policies and should be empowered to cut a 
country’s allocation from the EU’s common budget if it failed to comply with the Council’s 
recommendations. Furthermore, as a matter of common interest, economic policy should be 
jointly evaluated on a regular basis. In addition, while the main goal of monetary policy 
would remain the pursuit of price level stability, it should also support the EU’s overall 
economic policy (Proposal by the French Government 1993 [1991]: 343 f.). Not least as a 
result of the Mitterand regime’s failed experiment with an expansive fiscal and monetary 
policy in 1982, the French government’s proposals adhere to the fundamental principles of the 
consensus concerning price level stability and budget consolidation as described above. 
Nevertheless, in a similar way to the Commission’s proposal, they also call for greater co-
ordination with a view to concentrating the control of economic policy at EU level.  
 
The German proposal for the Maastricht Treaty, which was published one month after the 
French one, follows an economic policy approach that focuses on price level stability, in 
keeping with the Bundesbank’s established tradition. Unlike the French proposal, it makes no 
mention of placing constraints on monetary policy in order to support the EU’s overall 
economic policy. In contrast to the other proposals described above, the German alternative 
devotes a lot of attention to German ‘Ordnungspolitik’ issues such as free price formation in 
markets and privatisation. It is true that the German proposal also considers economic policy 
co-ordination to be a matter of common interest, but it refrains from talking of economic 
policy ‘guidelines’, preferring instead to use the term ‘orientations’. Moreover, the specific 
details of this co-ordination are confined to the prevention of budget deficits. The proposal 
does provide for cuts in a country’s allocation from the EU’s common budget as the sanction 
of choice, but only in case of a country failing to pursue an appropriate budgetary policy 
(Proposal by the German Government 1993 [1991]).  
 
The Dutch Presidency’s proposal of 28 October 1991 contains the first formulation of what 
would later become the convergence criteria (Proposal by the Dutch Presidency 1993 [1991]: 
230). Like the German proposal, it envisages a central bank modelled on the Bundesbank, and 
it also follows the German position in setting no fixed deadline for joining the monetary 
union, stating instead that countries may only join once they have met the convergence 
criteria. However, it also reflects the positions of the Commission and the French government 
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through the inclusion of extensive passages concerning economic policy co-ordination which, 
in addition to mentioning budgetary control, also refer to the regular drafting of economic 
policy guidelines.  
 
The Dutch compromise proposal brought the two sides closer to an agreement, and the 
ultimate results of the negotiations are well known. The independence of the ECB is 
enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty and is complemented by co-ordination procedures aimed 
mainly at controlling budget deficits (Treaty of Maastricht: Art. 103-109).
5 Despite 
Germany’s opposition, the stronger term of economic policy ‘guidelines’ (as opposed to 
‘orientations’) was chosen (Treaty of Maastricht: Art. 103 or Art. 99 of the current 
consolidated version of the EC Treaty. See also Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 412–416, 425) and 
the Treaty established an automatic mechanism for joining the monetary union (Treaty of 
Maastricht: Art. 109j or EC Treaty: Art. 121).  
 
How did these results come about? Clearly, a monetary union without the region’s key 
currency, the Deutschmark, would have been unthinkable, and this put Germany in a strong 
position in the negotiations. Furthermore, the high level of independence enjoyed by the 
Bundesbank compared to central banks elsewhere in Europe was seen as a model for the 
planned European Central Bank not only by the Bundesbank but also by the central banks in 
other countries. Consequently, there was widespread support right from the start for a strong 
ECB and for a budgetary control system. The convergence criteria and the irreversibility of 
the EMU process served as a solution to the problem of what to do about those who held 
opposing views regarding whether or not there should be a monetary union at all and who 
should participate, although the German delegation was not at all happy about having to 
accept this automatic mechanism. The Germans suffered another defeat with regard to the 
degree of planned co-ordination when they were forced to agree to the use of guidelines, 
thereby paving the way for the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. These concessions can be 
attributed to the fact that, after reunification, the German government was very keen to use 
monetary union as a clear and unequivocal sign of Germany’s place at the heart of Europe, 
and was therefore prepared to compromise (Dyson/Featherstone 1999: 363–369, Garrett 
2001: 118–123). 
 
                                                 
 
5 In 1996, the European Council further strengthened the co-ordination of national budgets when it 
introduced the Stability and Growth Pact. 
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3. Procedure and drafting 
 
Pressure from the European Commission and France thus led to the legal enshrinement in the 
Maastricht Treaty of a new procedure for economic policy co-ordination in the shape of the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (EC Treaty Art. 99).
6 The Guidelines are unique among 
EU-level co-ordination procedures, since they contain recommendations pertaining to all the 
policy areas that influence the economy, and because all the other co-ordination procedures 
are required to deliver results that are in line with the content of the Guidelines. 
Consequently, the Guidelines are the key reference point for the European Union’s common 
economic policy and as such represent the economic policy consensus at EU level.  
 
The 1993 Guidelines were drafted by the Commission and only had a few pages. Their main 
topic was the co-ordination of fiscal policy, and a supplementary document also dealt with 
structural reforms and wage policy. The Council of Ministers amended the Commission’s 
document to include extracts from the ‘White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and 
Employment’ (European Commission 1993) that had been drawn up under Jacques Delors, 
President of the Commission from 1985 until 1995. The first Guidelines followed the same 
fundamental approach to economic policy that has continued to be adopted to the present day 
and is based on a combination of a ‘stable macroeconomic framework’, low inflation and 
balanced budgets, together with structural reforms designed to foster growth and employment.  
 
Although reference to the situation in individual member countries is made as early as 1994 in 
the Commission’s draft versions of the Guidelines and from 1995 onwards also in the version 
approved by the Council of Ministers, it was not until the 1998 Guidelines that country-
specific recommendations were explicitly made for the first time, while more detailed 
country-by-country recommendations were only made from 1999 onwards. In 1994, the 
Commission started monitoring the extent to which the previous year’s proposals had been 
complied with, and from 1996 it began including an assessment of implementation of its 
proposals for the Guidelines. By 1997 it was issuing its own brief report on the 
implementation of the Guidelines, and this report started to appear in more detailed form from 
2000 onwards. In 1998, the sections dealing with structural reform of the goods, services and 
                                                 
 
6 Other more general legal points of reference for economic policy co-ordination are Articles 2, 4 and 98 of 
the EC Treaty. 
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labour markets were expanded and complemented by observations regarding the financial 
markets. The year 2000 saw the addition of passages relating to the knowledge society and the 
ageing of the population. Furthermore, following the decision taken at the Barcelona 
European Council, the scope of the recommendations contained in the Guidelines since 2003 
has been expanded to cover a three-year period rather than just the following year (Broad 
economic policy guidelines 2003, European Commission 2002b). These medium-term 
recommendations are expanded and updated annually, for the first time in 2004 (Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines 2004).  
 
Contrary to expectations, in 2005 the procedure has already changed again as a reaction to the 
ongoing debate on the Lisbon strategy of the 2000 summit. Aiming at a reduction of 
unemployment and a rising participation rate in the labour market, the results of the Lisbon 
strategy were mixed and not satisfactory after five years. Therefore the Commission prepared 
a relaunch by streamlining and simplifying the procedures (European Commission 2005). 
This Commission document served as a basis for the presidency conclusions of the Brussels 
Summit in 2005 (European Council 2005). One of the main effects of the revision of the 
strategy is the integration of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the Employment 
Guidelines into one document, the so called Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs 
(Integrated Guidelines 2005). Both guidelines are still separate texts but they are issued 
simultaneously for the same three-year period, and they are interlinked by cross reference 
where meaningful. 
 
The process by which the Guidelines are drawn up has changed as well with the revision of 
the Lisbon strategy and the orientation towards a three-year period. From 2005 on, the 
governance cycle starts with the new Integrated Guidelines being drafted by the Commission 
in April of the first year of the three-year period, endorsed by the European Council in June 
and adopted by the Council of Ministers after that. In autumn the member countries have to 
draw up newly introduced National Reform Programmes for three years describing their 
reform measures in order to meet the demands of the Guidelines. Each year the member 
countries as well as the Commission will report on the implementation in National Lisbon 
Reports on the side of the countries and a Progress Report covering all countries’ 
developments on the side of the Commission. If necessary, annual updates of the Integrated 
Guidelines will be published by the Commission.  
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Other bodies participate in this process in an advisory role, for example the Economic and 
Financial Committee and the Economic Policy Committee. Preparatory work undertaken by 
the member countries is also incorporated, and the European Parliament issues an opinion on 
the Commission’s draft of the Guidelines. The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines are 
therefore a Commission policy document that has been discussed with and agreed upon by 
several other bodies. It is thus a document that represents the economic policy consensus (or 
perhaps it would be more accurate to say a ‘compromise’ on economic policy) at European 
level and is approved by the Council of Ministers as the body representing the governments of 
the EU member countries. The member countries are committed to implement the 
recommendations contained in the Guidelines, although in contrast to the budgetary control 
measures of the Stability and Growth Pact, countries that fail to implement them cannot be 
sanctioned. As such, the Guidelines are a form of ‘soft co-ordination’ that relies on voluntary 
compliance by national governments and peer pressure.  
 
 
4. The economic policy model underlying the Guidelines 
 
The policy model underlying the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines has remained unchanged 
since 1993, its basis being the combination of a supposedly ‘stable’ macroeconomic 
framework with structural reforms. There have nevertheless been some shifts in the nature of 
their content over time, and these are examined below. We will be mainly concentrating on 
the Guidelines for the period 2005–2008 as the first part of the newly introduced Integrated 
Guidelines (Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 2005). The current version is the Commission 
recommendation which one would normally expect to be very similar in content to the final 
version approved by the Council of Ministers. 
 
Until 1999, the key goals of the Guidelines were sustained, non-inflationary growth and high 
employment in accordance with Art. 2 of the EC Treaty. Since the Lisbon Summit, however, 
the goals agreed on in Lisbon has been adopted. In the 2003–2005 version of the Guidelines 
the wording is identical with the central passage of the Lisbon strategy. The main goal is 
 
“(...) to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion” (BEPG 2003: 59, see also European Council 2000). 
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This orientation was recently approved by the integration of the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines and the Employment Guidelines into a single document serving as the main 
governance instrument for the Lisbon strategy.  
 
The main idea of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines is that structural reforms should be 
used to boost growth potential in order to achieve the above goal. According to the 
Guidelines, ‘sound’ macroeconomic conditions should enable the economy to realise this 
potential. The resulting growth would in turn lead to more and better jobs. It can thus be said 
that since the year 2000 the Guidelines have given concrete expression to the complementary 
relationship between macroeconomic policy and structural reforms for the first time. This is 
very explicit in the current version which is divided into two sections, section one containing 
macroeconomic guidelines concerning the macroeconomic framework and section two 
covering microeconomic guidelines dealing with the proposed structural changes. 
 
The core elements of the structural reforms are deregulation and liberalisation of goods, 
services, financial and labour markets, on the one hand (BEPG 2005. Integrated Guidelines 3, 
4, 7–11), and investment in Research & Development and innovation policy, on the other 
hand (Guidelines 12–15). The bulk of investment is supposed to come from the private sector, 
with the rest being obtained from the redeployment of public budgets. Furthermore, measures 
should be taken to expand the labour supply, increase the adaptability of the workforce and 
improve education. This is, however, no longer part of the Guidelines but it is treated in the 
second part of the Integrated Guidelines, the Employment Guidelines (Integrated Guidelines 
16–23).  
 
In order for the (supposedly) higher growth potential resulting from these structural reforms 
to be transformed into actual growth, it is argued that ‘sound macroeconomic conditions’ 
should prevail. These conditions are defined by the Guidelines as a stable monetary 
framework, fiscal discipline and modest wage increases (Integrated Guidelines 1, 2, 5, 6). The 
Guidelines consistently stipulate an assignment of the macro-political players in the fields of 
monetary, fiscal and wage policy and the instruments at their disposal to the economic policy 
targets. This approach strengthens the ECB’s focus on its primary goal, the creation of price 
stability, although once this has been ensured, the central bank is also supposed to support the 
EU’s economic policy. The job of fiscal policy, meanwhile, is to achieve a super-cyclically 
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balanced budget. Wage growth should not exceed the sum of inflation and trend productivity 
growth and in addition should take into account workplace productivity. 
 
The  Guidelines assume that the ECB’s monetary policy automatically concurs with the 
recommendations and have nothing further to say on the matter. They fail to question the 
ECB’s target of “medium-term inflation below but close to 2%” (ECB 2003: 89), which is, in 
fact, quite restrictive for a heterogeneous economic area with different growth rates and 
markedly divergent inflation rates; nor do they make any criticism of the asymmetrical and 
ultimately growth-unfriendly policy pursued by the ECB in the past. By the time of the 2001 
downturn, if not before, it had become clear that the ECB was not prepared to use its interest 
rate policy to contribute to economic recovery. Despite the fact that wage trends posed no 
threat to the achievement of the bank’s restrictive inflation target, the ECB was not willing – 
unlike the American Federal Reserve – to radically cut interest rates. The reason the bank 
gave for this was that inflation was still above its target. However, this was not a result of the 
other macro-political players pursuing policies that threatened stability, something that the 
ECB would have had to act against. Rather, it was due on the one hand to exogenous shocks 
(rises in the price of oil and epidemics such as BSE and foot-and-mouth disease) and on the 
other to the fall in productivity growth resulting from the economic downturn, for which the 
ECB co-shared the blame. The ECB’s monetary policy thus failed to comply with its remit of 




In accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact, the Guidelines require fiscal policy to be 
used to ensure that, in the medium-term, member countries have either balanced budgets or 
current budget surpluses. On the one hand, this is intended to ensure that national fiscal 
policies are protected against future recessions and are in a position to allow the automatic 
stabilisers to take full effect. On the other, it should free up financial resources to address the 
funding problems associated with demographic change and the ageing of the population. 
Despite the fact that greater public investment in research, education and infrastructure is 
urged, the recommendations do not mention borrowing as a means of financing this spending. 
On the contrary, management of the budget to obtain sustained current surpluses will involve 
reducing public debt to zero, which implies a rejection of what was until recently widely 
                                                 
 
7 For a more detailed critique of the ECB’s policy, see for example Allsopp/Artis (2003), Bibow (2002, 
2003), Hein (2002b), Hein/Truger (2005a, 2005b), Heine/Herr (2004) and Janssen (2005). 
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accepted as the ‘golden rule’ of fiscal policy, i.e. the principle of borrowing to fund the public 
capital stock. The Guidelines make no attempt to question the consolidation measures 
required by the SGP even during recessions, despite the fact that at the same time they urge 
that the automatic stabilisers should be allowed to take effect and that pro-cyclical policies 
should be avoided. Those member countries that have not reached their budgetary objectives 
should reduce their cyclically-adjusted deficits by 0.5% of GDP each year and should pursue 
higher improvements in good times. If such cuts were to be made in a recessive phase, 
however, they would have a marked pro-cyclical effect and would in fact exacerbate 
economic stagnation.  
 
According to the Guidelines, wage policy or wage trends
8 have to contribute to 
macroeconomic stability. It is therefore argued that wage trends in the member countries 
should be consistent with price level stability and trend productivity. Further explanations 
make clear that this is an upper limit and not a target. Wages should reflect workplace 
productivity, in other words there should be greater wage differentiation than in the past, and 
more important, wages should allow for a rate of profit that enhances productivity, capacity, 
and employment. In places, the Guidelines talk positively about the role of the social partners 
and even adopt a decidedly favourable tone with regard to collective wage bargaining. For 
example, they recommend that the social parties should agree to pursue a policy of wage 
moderation via the Macroeconomic Dialogue, a forum established by the Cologne Process in 
order to achieve a consensus among the players in the fields of monetary, fiscal and wage 
policy. In so doing, the Guidelines favour the corporatist approach to wage bargaining and, 
notwithstanding all their proposals regarding clauses allowing companies to diverge from 
collective agreements and the decentralisation of wage bargaining, they still support the 
principle of the social parties being responsible for negotiating wages. However, they 
completely fail to take into account the fact that a policy of promoting company-level wage 
settlements and wage differentiation actually undermines the social parties’ ability to act 
strategically in order to ensure wage trends that meet macroeconomic requirements, however 
these may be defined. They also neglect to consider whether, in the current stagnation 
scenario, wage increases below the combined figure for productivity gains and the ECB’s 
inflation target may, in fact, accentuate the EU’s macroeconomic problems by resulting in 
                                                 
 
8 No explicit mention is made of the term wage policy, and the only term actually used is wage trends. The 
reason for this choice of words is the British government’s view that there cannot and should not be any such 
thing as wage policy, a view which needs to be understood in the context of the UK’s decentralised wage 
bargaining system (Koll 2005: 132, footnote 8). 
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Contrary to former issues of the Guidelines the recent one does not deal with the question of 
co-ordination of policies. In the penultimate Guidelines by contrast a better co-ordination of 
monetary, wage and fiscal policy was demanded in order to achieve wage restraint, avoid 
public deficits and implement structural reforms (BEPG 2003: 67f.). As such, what is meant 
by co-ordination is gaining a commitment by the players to the programme outlined in the 
Guidelines, including the clear assignment of economic policy goals to the individual macro-
political players and the instruments at their disposal. However, the Guidelines do not 
understand co-ordination to mean that the players from different policy areas are heavily 
dependent on each other in order to achieve their policy goals, because the effects of 
individual policies are interdependent and it is therefore impossible for one policy area’s 
goals to be achieved without co-ordination with the other players. As has already been stated 
above, the Guidelines adopt an assignment approach that prescribes clearly defined 
responsibilities for the players in each policy area and operates on the assumption that they 
will be able to achieve these goals individually.  
 
In summary, it can be said that for more than a decade now the policy mix recommended by 
the Guidelines for the EMU has followed an economic policy model that Arestis et al. (2001) 
aptly describe as ‘new-monetarist’, the theoretical basis of which is a mixture of new-
classical, monetarist and new-Keynesian economic policy assignment (Hein 2002a). This 
model can be summarised in four points: 
 
1.  The private sector is stable in the long term. Say’s Law applies in the long term as does 
the classical dichotomy between nominal and real variables. Discretionary economic 
policies have a destabilising effect, and consequently economic policy decisions should 
be taken independently of the democratically elected political regime and should be 
subject to clearly defined rules.  
2.  Inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon in the long term. The role of independent 
central banks is to maintain price level stability, and they can use interest rate policy to 
control inflation without real economic costs.  
                                                 
 
9 For more on the deflationary pressures in Germany and Europe, see Hein et al. (2005). 
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3.  Unemployment fluctuates around an equilibrium level determined by supply-side 
factors that is known as the NAIRU (Non-Accelerating-Inflation-Rate-of-
Unemployment). This is independent of effective demand on goods markets and can be 
reduced by creating more flexible labour markets.  
4.  Fiscal policy has no long-term effect on growth and employment and should therefore 
be subordinated to the goal of price level stability. Within the context of the business 
cycle, however, it should passively accept budget surpluses and deficits within certain 
limits. 
 
This policy model also underlies all the other institutions and economic policy regulations of 
the EMU, for example the provisions concerning monetary policy in the EC Treaty (Art. 105), 
the ECB’s monetary policy strategy (1999, 2003), the EC Treaty’s provisions with regard to 
fiscal policy (Art. 104), the Stability and Growth Pact, the Employment Chapter of the EC 
Treaty (Art. 125-130), the annual Employment Guidelines (Luxembourg Process), and the 
reform of goods and capital markets (Cardiff Process). To some extent, the Guidelines bring 




5. Macroeconomic effects 
 
Now that the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines have been largely responsible for 
determining the direction of economic policy within the EU for a period of some ten years, 
the time has come to analyse the macroeconomic effects of the associated policy model. We 
are of course not suggesting that the recommendations contained in the Guidelines have 
always been implemented to the letter. However, we do believe that they provide a very 
accurate reflection of the fundamental direction followed by economic policy in the EU or at 
least in the EMU. For this reason and because of the limited space available, this section will 
not seek to provide an in-depth discussion of each individual policy area but will concentrate 
instead on analysing the fundamental approach taken with regard to economic policy. A 
comparison will be made of the evolution of macroeconomic target variables and some 
indicators of the policies implemented in the EMU countries between 1994 and 2003 with the 
period from 1984 to 1993. This will enable us to compare two ten-year periods that both 
                                                 
 
10 See European Commission (2002a) for an overview of economic policy processes within the EMU. See 
also Hein/Truger (2005a, 2005b) for a detailed analysis of the EMU’s restrictive policy mix.  
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include a recession in the end. Trends in the EMU will also be contrasted with developments 
in the USA, which constitutes an economic area with a single currency that is comparable in 
size to the EMU. Although the Guidelines apply to all the EU member countries, our 
empirical analysis will be confined to the EMU countries that have, since 1999, been directly 
subject to the centralised single monetary policy of the ECB as well as the Stability and 
Growth Pact’s regulations regarding fiscal policy. 
 
There is a broad consensus that the key macroeconomic target variables are economic growth, 
high employment and price level stability (Table 1)  
 
Table 1: Real GDP growth, unemployment and inflation in the EMU and the USA, 
annual averages for 1984-1993 and 1994-2003, in % 
EMU USA   
1984-1993  1994-2003 1984-1993 1994-2003 
Real GDP growth   2.7  2.1  3.3  3.3 
Unemployment 
rate  




4.5  2.1 3.8 2.4 
Source: OECD (2004), own calculations 
 
As far as GDP growth is concerned, it can be seen that the overall figures for the EMU were 
lower between 1994 and 2003 than for the period 1984 - 1993. While the average annual 
growth rate between 1984 and 1993 was 2.7%, it fell to just 2.1% between 1994 and 2003. 
Meanwhile, the USA experienced a stronger average growth rate of 3.3% in both periods. The 
unemployment figures reflect this falling GDP growth in the EMU countries and the fact that 
growth was lower than in the USA. Unemployment rose from an average of 8.7% between 
1984 and 1993 to an average of 9.6% in the period 1994 - 2003. In the USA, on the other 
hand, the average unemployment rate fell from 6.6% between 1984 and 1993 to 5.1% 
between 1994 and 2003, remaining below the EMU figure throughout the entire period under 
investigation. As far as the real target variables of growth and unemployment are concerned, 
the EMU countries’ performance since the introduction of the Guidelines has undergone a 
marked deterioration both in comparison with the previous ten years and with the USA. On 
the other hand, there has been an improvement with regard to the nominal target variable of 
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price level stability. The average annual inflation rate in the EMU countries fell from 4.5% 
between 1984 and 1993 to 2.1% in the period 1994-2003. This figure is slightly below the 
USA’s average of 2.4% for the same period, while the average inflation rate in the USA 
between 1984 and 1993 stood at 3.8%. Overall, it can be said that since 1994, the USA has 
been much more successful than the EMU countries in achieving a combination of high 
growth, low unemployment and price level stability. 
 
What are the reasons for the EMU countries’ unsatisfactory performance? Is it that the extent 
of the structural reforms called for by the Guidelines and the speed at which they were 
implemented were insufficient? Or were the recommendations for the macro-political players 
ultimately counterproductive? Based on a comprehensive data set assembled by Baker et al. 
(2004) that covers the development of indicators for labour market institutions and social 
security systems in 20 OECD countries between 1960 and 1999, Hein/Truger (2005c) 
developed a total index of the rigidity of labour market institutions and the welfare state and 
compared their development with that of the unemployment rate in the countries in question.
11 
This global index covers employment protection, the benefit replacement rate, benefit 
duration, union density, the degree of co-ordination of wage bargaining and the tax wedge. 
Much of the more recent literature on labour market theory predicts that these partial 
indicators will, to a greater or lesser extent, have a negative influence on employment 
(Nickell/Layard 1999, Nickell 1997). Figure 1 compares the changes in the total index of 
institutional sclerosis from 1995/99 against 1980/84, with the associated changes in 
unemployment rates in 20 OECD countries.  
                                                 
 
11 For more on the relationship between labour market and welfare state institutions, on the one hand, and 
employment, on the other hand, see Hein/Truger (2005c). 
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Figure 1: Change in the unemployment rate and in the total index of institutional sclerosis 
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On the one hand, it is clear that there is significant variation in the extent to which ‘structural 
reforms’ have been implemented in the EMU countries. The rigidity of the labour market and 
social security systems in Finland, Italy, Portugal and Ireland increased significantly, while it 
remained more or less the same in the Netherlands and decreased considerably in Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Austria and Belgium. On the other hand, it is equally clear that, on the 
whole, there is no unequivocal relation between the rigidity of labour market institutions and 
the welfare state on the one hand and the unemployment rate on the other. For example, 
although both Germany and the UK implemented structural reforms in similar measure, 
unemployment rose by almost 4 percentage points in Germany while in the UK it fell by more 
than 2 percentage points. Meanwhile, the significant fall in unemployment witnessed in the 
USA was achieved with a minimum of structural reforms.  
 
There is thus no conclusive proof that structural reforms have a systematically positive 
influence on economic performance. As such, it makes sense to consider whether the causes 
of the EMU countries’ unsatisfactory macroeconomic performance can be traced to the 
macroeconomic policy approach recommended in the Guidelines.  In the following 
paragraphs, the indicators for the monetary, wage and fiscal policy models will therefore be 
analysed (Table 2).  
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Table 2: Indicators for  monetary, wage and fiscal policies in the EMU and the USA, 
1984-1993 and 1994-2003 
EMU USA   
1984 - 1993  1994 - 2003  1984 - 
1993 
1994 - 2003 
Monetary policy       
Real GDP growth rate minus 
short-term real interest rate 
(percentage points) 
-2.3   -0.1  0.0  1.2 
Wage policy       
Growth in nominal 
compensation per employee (%) 
5.2 2.3  4.4 3.5 
Growth in nominal unit labour 
costs (%) 
4.4 1.5  2.9 1.7 
Labour income share (% of 
GDP at factor costs) 
70.7 67.6  68.6 67.5 
Fiscal policy       
Number of years with a pro-
cyclical fiscal policy 
7 4  5 2 
Real public investment as a 
share of real GDP (%) 
2.9 2.5  3.3 3.1 
Source: European Commission (2004), OECD (2004), own calculations 
 
As far as monetary policy is concerned, it is important to consider the relationship between 
the real short-term interest rate and the real GDP growth rate. While it is true that the central 
bank only directly controls the short-term nominal interest rate, it nevertheless also 
determines the real short-term interest rate, owing to the fact that it sets its nominal rate with 
an eye to inflation. If the real interest rate is above the real GDP growth rate, the result is a 
redistribution of wealth from debtors to creditors, and the risk of debtors becoming over-
indebted increases. This is an unfavourable scenario in terms of growth and economic 
activity, since it encourages investment in financial assets as opposed to real assets. 
 
Even between 1984 and 1993, the average difference between GDP growth and interest rates 
in the USA was 0.0 percentage points, indicating a markedly less restrictive monetary policy 
than in the future EMU countries, where monetary policy was dominated by the Bundesbank 
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and the average difference stood at -2.3 percentage points. Although both economic areas 
witnessed a trend towards a more expansive monetary policy in the period 1994 - 2003, policy 
in the USA did much more to promote growth and economic activity than in the EMU. In the 
USA, the average difference between GDP growth and interest rates during this period was 
1.2 percentage points, as opposed to just -0.1 percentage points in the EMU countries. This is 
the more remarkable, because until 1999 the EMU countries were still benefiting from the 
reduction in their interest rates to the lower level found in Germany, the region’s key currency 
country.
12 The ECB’s more restrictive approach to monetary policy compared to the Federal 
Reserve once again became particularly apparent after the 2001 recession. While the Fed 
managed to promote a growth-friendly constellation with a positive difference of 1.95 
percentage points between real GDP growth and short-term real interest rates on average 
between 2001 and 2003, the ECB proved much more reluctant to act because in the Euro area 
this difference remained still slightly negative with -0.04 percentage points on average. 
 
The wage policies pursued by the social parties, or the wage settlements arrived at on the 
labour market, determine the nominal wage rate and hence also nominal unit labour costs, 
when labour productivity is considered to be given or following an exogenous trend. Insofar 
as businesses pass on unit labour cost fluctuations directly to prices, wage policy influences 
inflation. If these changes are not passed on fully, there will also be changes in functional 
income distribution, which is measured here by the labour income share. A combination of 
high unemployment, labour market deregulation and the emergence of national competitive 
social pacts that govern collective bargaining has caused a significant decline in the growth 
rate of nominal compensations per employee in the EMU countries from 5.2% on average 
between 1984 and 1993 to an average 2.3% between 1994 and 2003. Therefore, average unit 
labour cost growth in the EMU countries fell from 4.4% between 1984 and 1993 to 1.5% 
between 1994 and 2003.
13  
 
In the USA average annual growth of nominal compensation per employee also declined from 
the first to the second period from 4.4% to 3.5%, hence to a much lesser extent. A reduction 
was also seen in the nominal unit labour cost growth, albeit also a more modest one than in 
the EMU from 2.9% to 1.7%. In both regions, modest wage increases made a key contribution 
                                                 
 
12 For a more detailed analysis, see Hein/Truger (2005b). 
 
13 For more on the causes and consequences of the modest wage increases in the EMU countries, see Hein 
(2002b), Hein/Schulten (2004) and Hein et al. (2005). 
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to the sharp fall in inflation described above. While wage trends in the EMU countries 
between 1984 and 1993 were at times still clearly inflationary and thus not conducive to 
stability, in the period between 1994 and 2003 they no longer posed a threat to low inflation, 
nor did they put the achievement of the ECB’s inflation target at risk from 1999 onwards.
14 
Even the fact that unit labour cost growth has risen slightly above the 2% mark since 2001 is 
more a consequence of the fall in productivity growth resulting from the cyclical downturn 
than of a wage policy that fails to promote stability (Hein/Truger 2005a). Consequently, wage 
trends could have allowed for a much more expansive monetary policy than that pursued by 
the ECB without unleashing inflationary pressures.  
 
Another consequence of the wage restraint practised in the EMU countries since 1994 has 
been a further fall in the labour income share from an average of 70.7% between 1984 and 
1993 to a figure of 67.6% between 1994 and 2003. While the labour income share in the USA 
also fell from 68.6% to 67.5%, this fall was far less pronounced than in the EMU. In the EMU 
countries, a lower proportion of the fall in unit labour cost growth was passed on to 
commodity prices than in the USA, as can be seen from a comparison of the annual averages 
for inflation and unit labour cost growth in Tables 1 and 2. If the propensity to consume out of 
labour income exceeds the propensity to consume out of profit income, it can be assumed that 
the redistribution to the detriment of labour will have a negative impact on consumer demand, 
which is the largest element of aggregate demand. This will also negatively affect GDP 
growth, unless the redistribution in favour of profits leads directly to increased investment or 
the improvement in price competitiveness on international markets achieved by wage restraint 
leads to a major increase in export surpluses. It is clear that neither of the above has happened 
in the EMU since 1994, at least not to a sufficient degree.  
 
The extent to which fiscal policy exerts a stabilising or destabilising influence on the 
economy can be assessed by comparing changes in the output gap and the structural budget 
balance (Figs. 2 and 3). The output gap serves as an indicator of the current state of economic 
activity. If it is positive, then capacity is being outstripped, if it is negative, this means that 
                                                 
 
14 It should be noted that the combined figures for the EMU countries hide considerable differences with 
regard to national unit labour cost and inflation trends (Hein/Truger 2005b). Thus, since the mid-1990s, unit 
labour cost growth and inflation in Germany have been significantly below the EMU average. This has meant 
that the EMU’s largest member has been exposed to major deflationary pressures, as recognised by the IMF 
(2003), and has also been heavily constrained in its ability to achieve economic growth owing to the fact that, 
now that nominal interest rates are the same across the EMU, real interest rates in Germany are significantly 
higher than in the other EMU countries (Hein et al. 2005, Hein/Truger 2005c). 
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capacity is not being fully utilised. Consequently, a positive change in the output gap 
indicates a cyclical upturn whereas a negative change points to a cyclical downturn. While the 
overall budget deficit or surplus is the result of macroeconomic processes and cannot 
therefore be controlled by fiscal policy, the structural, i.e. cyclically adjusted, budget balance 
can be controlled by policy and can therefore be seen as a fiscal policy instrument. If there is a 
negative change in the structural budget balance, then structural deficits rise or structural 
surpluses fall, and fiscal policy provides an expansive stimulus to aggregate demand. If there 
is a positive change in the structural budget balance, then structural deficits fall or structural 
surpluses rise, and fiscal policy provides a restrictive stimulus to demand. If the structural 
budget balance remains the same when there is a change in the output gap, then fiscal policy 
is neither expansive nor restrictive and the automatic stabilisers are simply left to take effect.  
 
Figure 2: Change in the structural budget balance and in the output gap to previous 
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Figure 3: Change in the structural budget balance and in the output gap to previous 
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Between 1984 and 1993, the fiscal policy of the future EMU countries, which at this time was 
not yet subject to co-ordination, was pro-cyclical in seven of the ten years in this period. In 
four of these years (1985, 1986, 1988, 1990) it acted to reinforce a recovery and in three years 
it accentuated a cyclical slowdown or recession (1991, 1992, 1993). Between 1994 and 2003, 
the fiscal policy of the member countries was now ‘co-ordinated’, initially as part of the EMU 
convergence process and latterly through the SGP, and this served to make it somewhat less 
pro-cyclical. It was only pro-cyclical in four of the ten years in this period, reinforcing a 
cyclical recovery in two years (1995, 2000) and accentuating a downturn in a further two 
years (1996, 2003). However, fiscal policy, too, fares poorly in comparison with the USA. 
While between 1984 and 1993, US fiscal policy was pro-cyclical in five years, only 
exacerbating a downturn on one occasion (1991), between 1994 and 2003 it was only slightly 
pro-cyclical in two years, reinforcing a cyclical slowdown in 1995 and 2000. However, the 
cyclical downturn in 2001 was met with decisive expansive measures even before the year 
was out. Particularly during the 1990s, therefore, US fiscal policy constituted an example of 
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budget consolidation without pro-cyclical measures, and as is well known the US achieved 
budget surpluses at the end of the upturn. 
 
If we accept that public spending on infrastructure, education, etc. is a key requirement for 
private investment, and if we use public investment as a percentage of GDP as an indicator of 
the extent to which fiscal policy fosters growth, then once again the USA fares better than the 
EMU countries. Throughout the whole of the period being investigated, public investment as 
a percentage of GDP in the US remained comfortably above 3%, showing only a slight 
reduction from 3.3% on average to 3.1%  between the two ten-year periods. In the EMU 
countries, on the other hand, the figure was lower than in the USA for the entirety of the study 
period, and fell from an average of 2.9% between 1984 and 1993 to an average of 2.5% 
between 1994 and 2003. Consequently, not only did the EMU convergence process’ and 
SGP’s drive to achieve budget consolidation force countries to implement a more pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy, but it also had a particularly negative impact on public investment and hence 
damaged future growth prospects. 
 
In summary, differences in the macroeconomic policy mix offer a plausible explanation for 
the growth slowdown and the increase in unemployment in the EMU since 1994 and for the 
divergent macroeconomic performance of the EMU countries and the USA.
15 Even in the 
period 1984 - 1993, the USA’s approach to monetary and fiscal policy and its wage trends did 
much more to promote economic activity and growth than in the European countries included 
in this study. This difference was accentuated between 1994 and 2003 as a result of the EMU 
convergence process and the Maastricht macroeconomic regime encapsulated in the 
Guidelines. The economic policy recommendations contained in the Guidelines can thus be 
described as inadequate and largely counterproductive.  
 
 
6. Institutional and policy changes for sustained higher growth 
 
If we accept the view that, since the 1993 recession, the disappointing growth and 
employment trends in the current EMU member countries can largely be attributed to the 
  22
                                                 
 
15  For more on why the USA’s significantly above-average performance compared to other countries can be 
put down to its macroeconomic policy mix, see Fritsche et al. (2005), Kalmbach (2000), Schulmeister (2001) 
and Solow (2000).   23 
policy mix recommended in the Guidelines, then in order for the EMU economies to be 
revitalised it will be necessary to abandon the policy of structural reforms aimed at boosting 
growth potential and implement instead a U-turn in macroeconomic policy, with a new 
monetary, wage and fiscal policy mix. 
 
The Guidelines will only be able to contribute to this if the overall guidelines and the country-
specific recommendations are thoroughly reformed. Such a reform would involve substituting 
a new model for the new-monetarist economic policy model described above, with its 
associated assignment approach. The Keynesian or post-Keynesian concept of a co-ordinated 
macroeconomic policy offers a model that would to a large extent respond to the issues 




1.  In a monetary production economy, Say’s Law and the classical dichotomy between the 
real and monetary spheres do not apply, neither in the short nor the long term. The 
private sector is unstable and therefore needs to be stabilised by a policy that controls 
effective demand in both the short and long term. In order for this to be achieved, 
medium to long-term co-ordination of monetary, fiscal and wage policy is required.  
2.  The central bank’s interest rate policy influences effective demand, in particular private 
investment. In the long term, it also has an impact on functional income distribution. 
Consequently, monetary policy has significant short-term and long-term real effects. Its 
short-term effects, however, are asymmetrical. While the central bank is able to stop 
booms by raising interest rates, it is not able to put an end to recessions by cutting 
interest rates at times when profit expectations are depressed. In such cases, it is heavily 
reliant on support from fiscal and/or wage policy.  
3.  The nominal wage policy of the bargaining parties has no direct influence either on the 
level of employment or on income distribution. What it does influence is nominal unit 
labour costs for a given level of labour productivity and the price level once the mark-
up in firms’ pricing is given. Changes in distribution are only possible if allowed by the 
factors that influence the mark-up, for example the level of competition on the goods 
markets or the long-term interest rate. Employment levels are determined by the level of 
effective demand on the goods market, the evolution of which is largely governed by 
                                                 
 
16 For a more detailed analysis, see Hein (1998, 2002a), Hein/Truger (2005a), Heine/Herr (1999: 315 ff.). 
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private investment. This in turn is dependent on the relationship between the profit rate 
expected by businesses and the interest rate.  
4.  In the short term, fiscal policy can stabilise the economic cycle by accepting cyclically 
determined deficits and surpluses. In the long term, effective demand can be increased 
and growth potential boosted if a policy of investment-oriented borrowing is pursued. In 
addition, the government’s taxation and social policy will modify the distribution of 
disposable income, meaning in turn that consumer demand, which is the largest element 
of aggregate demand, can be influenced. The government’s competition policy affects 
the level of competition on the goods market and hence also influences mark-ups and 
functional income distribution.  
 
Owing to the interdependencies related to the deployment of the instruments at the disposal of 
the economic policy players and the fact that the target variables are all influenced by several 
different instruments, the Keynesian or post-Keynesian model rejects a strict assignment of 
players and instruments to a single specific economic policy goal, and consequently calls for 
co-ordination with regard to the deployment of the instruments. The nature of this co-
ordination can be either implicit, i.e. where the players all take the interdependencies into 
account individually, or it can take the shape of explicit, institutionalised ex-ante co-
ordination. Either way, the key is for the players to be aware of the interdependent nature of 
their actions and for there to be a consensus with regard to the likely effects of their deploying 
the instruments at their disposal. Accordingly, co-ordination requires at least a minimum 
degree of consensus concerning the analysis of economic causalities, the diagnosis and 
prognosis of the economic situation and the economic policy goals to be pursued (Priewe 
2002).  
 
In order for such a co-ordinated macroeconomic policy to be implemented within the EMU, it 
will by definition be necessary for the key players to abandon the policy orientation that has 
hitherto been recommended by the Guidelines.
17 In order for wage policy to be able to exert a 
nominal and real stabilising influence as outlined above and to avoid exacerbating regional 
disparities within the EMU, nominal wage increases in the individual member countries 
should be equal to sum of long-term national productivity growth and the ECB’s target 
inflation rate. Consequently, as much attention should be paid to avoiding wage dumping 
                                                 
 
17 For a more detailed version of the following arguments, see Hein/Truger (2005a). 
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between the member countries as to preventing inflationary wage settlements that require 
restrictive intervention by the central bank. In order to achieve a nominally stabilising wage 
policy, what is required is effective co-ordination of wage bargaining systems not only 
nationally but also, in particular, at EMU level. This in turn requires trade unions and 
employers’ associations at national level that are able to bargain and develop strategies 
effectively and are in a position to conclude and ensure the implementation of settlements 
oriented towards the economy as a whole (Kittel/Traxler 2001). Key instruments to this end 
are multi-employer collective bargaining and the universal extension of collective agreements. 
The decentralisation of collective bargaining and promotion of individual company-level 
wage settlements recommended in the Guidelines are as diametrically opposed to these 
requirements as a further deregulation of the European labour market. However, for wage 
policy in the EMU to be able to fulfil its role as part of a co-ordinated macroeconomic policy, 
in addition to the need for economic policy completely to abandon the current strategy of 
labour market deregulation and decentralisation of collective bargaining, increased efforts by 
the trade unions to achieve effective European-level co-ordination of their wage demands will 
also be required (Schulten 2002, 2004, 2005).
18
 
In the context of a co-ordinated macroeconomic policy, monetary policy also assumes 
responsibility for growth and employment, especially when there is no inflationary pressure 
from wage policy or fiscal policy. Consequently, monetary policy should not be treated as 
sacrosanct, as is currently the case in the Guidelines. The ECB should therefore make much 
more fundamental changes to its monetary strategy than in the last review in May 2003, by 
formulating its inflation target as a point or corridor target that is to be pursued in a 
symmetrical fashion.
19 This means that, in contrast to what it has done hitherto, the ECB 
should not only combat upward deviations from its inflation target but should also fight 
downward deviations equally vigorously. Additionally, the inflation target should be raised in 
order to take account of the fact that the EMU member countries have different long-term 
growth trends and correspondingly different rates of inflation. Furthermore, the ECB should 
pay more attention to the growth and employment targets, occasionally testing the growth 
potential of the euro zone by means of a controlled monetary expansion, along the lines of 
                                                 
 
18    In the EMU, a co-ordination approach such as this must be based on existing national co-ordination 
mechanisms and should seek to network these trans-nationally. Such a decentralised approach might, for 
example, involve the trade unions in the metalworking industry taking on the role of wage leadership at 
European level, too. This would mean that the collective bargaining policy of Germany’s IG Metall in particular 
would play a central role. Cf. Traxler/Mermet (2003) for details of such an approach. 
 
19 Cf. Meyer (2001) for different monetary strategies. 
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what the US Federal Reserve did in the second half of the 1990s (Allsopp 2002). Such a 
policy takes account of the fact that growth potential and the NAIRU are not exogenously 
determined variables, but are in fact jointly determined by real GDP growth and employment 
trends both of which are also influenced by monetary policy (Fontana/Palacio-Vera 2005, 
Hein 2002b, 2004, Lavoie 2004, Sawyer 2002). 
 
At present, any use of fiscal policy in the EMU to stabilise the economy, combat regional 
asymmetries and improve the long-term growth trend would contravene the current SGP 
regulations that are endorsed by the Guidelines. The pressure to achieve budget consolidation 
imposed by the SGP has been at its greatest during times of recession and has forced the 
adoption of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy with its particularly negative effects on public 
investment. At the same time, there have been no consolidation regulations for economic 
booms. Notwithstanding this, co-ordination of national fiscal policies in the monetary union is 
necessary so that the automatic stabilisers can be allowed to take effect in economic 
downturns, to avoid free-riding by individual member countries, and to prevent inflationary 
budgetary behaviour by some member countries during economic booms. As part of a co-
ordinated fiscal policy in the EMU, therefore, individual countries should be obliged to allow 
the automatic stabilisers to operate symmetrically, i.e. during both downturns and upturns. To 
this end, further reforms than those agreed upon by the ECOFIN and endorsed by the 
European Council in March 2005 are required.
20 The countries should draw up country-
specific expenditure paths for non-investment, non-cyclical public spending, which would be 
funded in the long term by current tax revenue. Cyclical spending should then be allowed to 
float freely around this target without being constrained by budget deficit limits. In a 
downturn, increases in expenditure and falling revenue lead to budget deficits that are 
financed by borrowing, thus increasing the level of debt. In an upturn, on the other hand, 
budget surpluses are generated, which can then be used for consolidation purposes. Alignment 
of the expenditure path with a growth rate below that of the nominal potential GDP path can 
                                                 
 
20 These reforms do neither question the 3% of GDP deficit criterion for the public budget and the 60% of 
GDP criterion for public debt nor do they change the goal of a balanced budget in the long term (ECOFIN 2005). 
There is also no change in the treatment of public investment within these targets. The reform of the SGP rather 
recommends to take into account the level of debt, the extent of structural reforms, public investment, and 
payments to international organisations and to the EU when it comes to the excessive deficit procedure. 
Excessive deficits shall not only be allowed when real GDP goes down by more than 2% but already with 
negative real growth or with a persistent output gap. 
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therefore contribute to a revenue-side budget consolidation if a structural deficit requiring 
consolidation existed at the outset.
21
 
The possibility of borrowing to finance public investment should exist as a matter of principle 
(the Golden Rule). Each EMU member state should therefore be able to decide for itself on 
the level and funding method of public investment. Even if the other current SGP regulations 
were maintained, this alone would be enough to mean that consolidation pressure would no 
longer continue to force down the level of public investment (Blanchard/Giavazzi 2003). 
Member countries could use public investment to stabilise long-term effective demand at a 
level compatible with high employment (Allsopp 2002). Public investment in infrastructure 
could be used to increase growth potential and to accelerate the productivity catch-up between 
countries. 
 
The outlined approach to monetary and fiscal policy, together with a re-orientation of wage 
policy, would constitute a move away from the restrictive new-monetarist policy mix hitherto 
recommended in the Guidelines  and would involve implicit co-ordination, in that the 
interdependencies of economic policy would be taken into account. This could in turn make a 
considerable contribution towards stimulating growth and reducing unemployment in the 
EMU. However, since a co-ordinated macroeconomic policy requires a minimum level of 
consensus between the players with regard to economic causalities, the diagnosis and 
prognosis of the economic situation and the goals to be pursued, the efficiency of any such 
co-ordination could be increased significantly if there were to be explicit ex ante co-
ordination among the players regarding deployment of the instruments at their disposal. 
Accordingly, in addition to the reformed Guidelines, the Macroeconomic Dialogue could act 
as a forum for promoting consensus between the monetary, fiscal and wage policy players, 





                                                 
 
21 This formed the basis of the US budget consolidation in the 1990s (Horn/Scheremet 1999). On a similar 
proposal for Germany, see Bartsch et al. (2002) and Eicker-Wolf/Truger (2003). 
 
22 For more on the Macroeconomic Dialogue, see Niechoj (2005). 
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7. Summary 
 
The  Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, which were created as a policy instrument for 
fostering growth and employment and intended to act as a counterbalance to purely monetary 
integration, have failed to fulfil this remit. This is not because their policy recommendations 
have been incompletely or wrongly implemented. Rather, it is the fault of the policy 
recommendations themselves and the economic policy model on which they are based. We 
have shown how, over the last ten years, this model, which is based on structural reforms and 
strict assignment of the macro-political players and the instruments at their disposal to 
individual goals, has resulted in a consistently poorer macroeconomic performance in the 
EMU countries compared with the preceding ten years and with the USA. We have also 
outlined the principles of an alternative policy model that is based on the co-ordinated 
deployment of monetary, wage and fiscal policy with a view to achieving steady growth and 
high employment whilst at the same time maintaining price stability. Moreover, this policy 
model avoids the further undermining of social cohesion that is resulting from the current 
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